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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the task of automatically detecting outcomes of
social interaction patterns, using non-verbal audio cues in competi-
tive role-playing games (RPGs). For our experiments, we introduce
a new data set which features 3 hours of audio-visual recordings of
the popular “Are you a Werewolf?” RPG. Two problems are ap-
proached in this paper: Detecting lying or suspicious behavior using
non-verbal audio cues in a social context and predicting participants’
decisions in a game-day by analyzing speaker turns. Our best clas-
sifier exhibits a performance improvement of 87% over the baseline
for detecting deceptive roles. Also, we show that speaker turn based
features can be used to determine the outcomes in the initial stages
of the game, when the group is large.
Index Terms— Deception, Role Analysis, Nonverbal Behavior
1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the analysis of non-
verbal social signals using machine learning and signal processing
by the computer science community [1, 2, 3]. The understanding of
behavior in teams, that can be either cooperative or competitive, is of
vital importance for organizational management [4]. Understanding
individual behavior and estimating when people may be suspicious
of others is important for preventing the breakdown of trust within
teams or other social relationships.
Thus the objective of this work is to discover through a social
setting, how deceptive roles affect the way people behave both as
actors and perceivers of a particular behavioral type. In addition,
since we are considering deception in the context of role playing
games, questions are raised about why people are willing to become
engaged even when rewards are small. One could conclude that the
thrill of living a different role that contrasts with our daily lives can
help us to de-stress. Understanding the mechanisms in games that
encourages enjoyment and escapism can also help in the design of
better games. Finally, automatic estimates of roles and deceptive
behavior in the context of game playing can be useful for mining
and browsing personal recordings of families and friends as storage
and recording devices become a standard commodity but organizing
and finding past events becomes more difficult.
In social psychology, the analysis and detection of deception is
an active research area [5] for both crime prevention and psychiatric
purposes. Deception is defined as “a successful or unsuccessful de-
liberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief
which the communicator considers to be untrue” [5] (p.15). Detect-
ing deception can be approached from two perspectives; we can ana-
lyze verbal responses, or, alternatively, non-verbal behavior [5]. This
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can be inferred from vocal and/or visual cues [5]. Vocal cues refer to
pitch, pauses, laughter etc. and visual cues refer to illustrators1, body
movements, eye blinks etc. Of these, increase in pitch and decrease
in illustrators, have been found to be the strongest indicators of de-
ception. However, these the extent to which these changes occur are
influenced by factors such as the motivation, the stakes involved and
the personality of the liar [5].
Recently, automatic detection of lies using machine learning has
been investigated. Hirschberg et al. [6] introduced the Columbia-
SRI-Colorado (CSC) Corpus that contains audio with transcription
of interviews of participants, who are motivated to lie for financial
and self-presentational gains. It shows that acoustic/prosodic cues
give a slightly improved performance, with an error of 38.5% over
the baseline of 39.8%, in which the most probable class (truth) is
chosen all the time. Another study on the CSC corpus [7], shows that
a combination of prosodic, acoustic and lexical features drops the
error to 36%. Also, T.O. Meservy et. al [8] investigated supervised
learning of visual cues for detecting lies. All the work described
above had liars face interviews, in a dyadic scenario.
In another study, M. Sung and A. Pentland describe the use of
non-invasive sensors to gather physiological and acoustic data in a
poker playing scenario [9]. The cues used in this work, resemble
those used in polygraph examinations [5]. However, this method is
obtrusive. To our knowledge, no work has been done on the more
challenging problem of automatically detecting deception in large
social groups using non-invasive methods.
Automatically estimating roles has been tested on televised com-
petitions/debates and cooperative meetings [2, 3]. S. Favre et. al. [3]
used televised political debates where two teams of two choose a po-
sition to debate on, so those on opposing teams would tend to talk
after each other. It was shown that affiliation networks built from
speaker turns could be used for detecting roles. In some cases [2], an
open and competitive environment is present, in which participants
freely interact with each other. In [2], features derived from speaker
turns were used with a ranking-based scheme, to predict outcomes.
Here, we present work on two different tasks: (i) the use of a rel-
evance vector machine that uses non-verbal audio cues to automati-
cally detect liars in a role playing game; (ii) automatically predicting
decisions made in the game by analyzing speaker turns.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data
set. Section 3 defines the two tasks of deception/suspicious behavior
detection and predicting outcomes in the game. Section 4 deals with
the feature extraction. Section 5 describes our approach in address-
ing the two tasks. Section 6 presents the results. Finally, Section 7
enlists conclusions and guidance for future work.
1hand/arm movements, that modify and/or supplement what is being said
verbally
2. THE “WEREWOLF” DATA SET
“Are you a Werewolf?” is an RPG suited for large groups and is a
game of accusations, lying, second-guessing, assassination and mob
hysteria [10]. This game was particularly chosen for three reasons:
(i) deception occurs in a large social group where the liars are an
informed minority and must be found through discussions; (ii) col-
lective decisions are made through discussions about who the liars
are, which enables us to easily record decisions made by the players;
(iii) deceptive and suspicious behavior can be differentiated easily.
A detailed mathematical analysis of the outcomes of this game, for
different group sizes has been done in the past [11].
The game proceeds as follows: The players are divided into vil-
lagers and werewolves. Some villagers also have special roles (ex-
plained later). The game proceeds in two alternating phases. The
game-night, in which the villagers are asleep (have their eyes closed)
and the werewolves kill a villager of their choice and the game-day
in which everybody is awake. In this phase, all players can talk and
decide to lynch a person whom they believe to be a werewolf. Once
someone is lynched, they are out of the game and may not speak. The
game ends when all werewolves are dead (villagers win) or the num-
ber of werewolves and villagers become equal (werewolves win).
Many variants of the game exist [10]. Our recordings contain 2
werewolves per game, with a seer and/or a little girl. The choice of
whether these roles existed in a game as well as the assignments were
made at random. The seer can obtain the real identity of any person
during each night phase. The little girl is active all the time and can
sneak-peek at what happens in the night. The seer and little girl are
“special” roles assigned to certain villagers who must be careful not
to reveal their identity too early on in the game, for fear of being
killed by the werewolves.
The “Werewolf” data set consists of audio-visual recordings of
8 games played by 2 groups of people. In total 18 different people
were recorded for the data set. The groups had a size of 10 and 8 par-
ticipants respectively. Each group also had a discussion phase at the
start of the session, so that players could familiarize themselves with
the rules. The video was recorded using three horizontally mounted
cameras. Audio was recorded from head-mounted microphones and
an array microphone placed at the center at 48kHz. Figures 1 and 2
show a sample of the visual data and the game room layout respec-
tively. The maximum duration of a game-day was set to be 2× (No.
of players). This gave us 53.82 hours of audio data. In total, the
recording lasted for 3 hours.
For our work, we assigned players to one of the five “Native”
classes for every game-day, based on their roles (see Table 1). Four
“Derived” classes were defined by combining these native classes,
for the purpose of defining deceptive and suspicious behavior (listed
in Table 2). The data from DI was not used in our experiments.
Fig. 1. Video sample from right, front and left cameras (Right-Left).
Some faces have been obscured for privacy reasons
3. ESTIMATION TASKS
In this paper, we address two tasks:
Deception and Suspicious Behavior Detection: For this problem,
we define two classification problems. The first one is between the
Class Pts Description
Successful Liar
(SL)
26 A werewolf surviving the game-day
without being lynched.
Unsuccessful
Liar (USL)
10 A werewolf lynched by the villagers dur-
ing the game-day.
Suspicious
Villager (SV)
11 A villager mistaken for a werewolf and
lynched during the game-day
Normal Villager
(NV)
105 A villager not killed in the game-day
Dead/Invalid
Player (DI)
- A player killed in one of the previous
phases or not present
Table 1. Native Classes
Class Pts Description
Liar (L) 36 Werewolves, {SL} ∪ {USL})
Non-Liar (NL) 116 Villagers, {SV} ∪ {NV}
Suspicious
Behavior (SB)
21 Lynched players, {USL}∪{SV}
Normal Behavior
(NB)
131 Players not lynched, {SL}∪{NV}
Table 2. Derived Classes
Fig. 2. Recording room setup
liars (L) and non-liars (NL), which is the standard deception de-
tection task. The second one is between the suspicious behaviour
(SB) and normal behaviour (NB), which is based on the ground-truth
obtained from the participants’ decisions. This task enables us to
find behavior that the players perceive to be suspicious, regardless
of whether they are playing deceptive roles or not.
Outcome Prediction: In task of predicting the decisions made in
every game-day amounts to the detection of players that belong to
either USL or the SV classes. This is similar to the suspicious
behaviour detection task described previously with one main differ-
ence. Here, the choice of suspicious people is narrowed down to the
players who are still alive in the given game day. Therefore, a sin-
gle person is selected from all the alive players, who has the highest
chance of being lynched by the players in that game-day.
4. FEATURE EXTRACTION
The audio channels from head-mounted microphones were down-
sampled to 8kHz and passed through a voice activity detector de-
scribed in [12]. The output of the voice activity detector was repre-
sented in a binary format, based on decisions every 12.5ms. A value
of “1” for a frame indicated that the player spoke in that frame. In
this context, we define the following:
1. Speaker Turn as a continuous duration of a player’s speech.
2. A Successful Interruption of a speaker i by a speaker j to
occur when speaker j starts to speak before a turn of speaker
i is over and continues to speak even after that is over.
3. An Unsuccessful Interruption of a speaker i by a speaker j to
occur when speaker j starts to speak before a turn of speaker
i is over and stops speaking before that turn is over.
These concepts are illustrated in Figure 3 and the features we used
for our experiments are listed in Table 3. The audio features were
extracted once every game-day, for every player (listed in Table 3).
SPEAKER A
SPEAKER B
SPEAKER ACTIVITY
SPEAKER A
SPEAKER B
SPEAKER ACTIVITY
Unsuccessful Interruption 
of A by B
Successful Interruption of 
A by B
Fig. 3. Illustration of interruptions and turn transfers
Feature Name Description
Total Speaking
Length (TSL)
Ratio of number of frames with speaker-
activity to the duration of the day.
Total Speaking
Turns (TST)
The number of turns normalized by the du-
ration of the game-day.
Unsuccessful
Interruptions
Received (UIR)
The number times unsuccessfully inter-
rupted by other players.
Interruption
Activity (IA)
Sum of the number of interruptions made
and received.
µ, σ of Pitch
(mF0, sF0)
Mean and standard deviation (SD) of the
median pitch values for each turn (com-
puted using [13]).
µ, σ of Speaking
Rate (mSR, sSR)
Mean and SD value of speaking rate (com-
puted from [14])
µ, σ of Power
(PR, sPR)
Mean and SD value of the speech signal
power [13]
µ, σ of Power
Ratio (PRT,
sPRT)
Mean and SD value of ratio of aperiodic to
periodic power in the speech signal [13]
Table 3. Features extracted per game-day (µ = mean, σ=Standard
deviation) .
5. OUR APPROACH
Deception and Suspicious Behavior Detection: For this experi-
ment, we computed the z-score of the features, so that we capture
the change in their values from the overall mean, for a given player.
The assumption behind this is that the lying or suspicious behavior
will correspond to features that deviate a lot from the mean of all the
features for that player. When fusing features, PCA based dimen-
sionality reduction was done to reduce complexity and to remove
uninformative dimensions. Due to the high imbalance in the num-
ber of data points between classes, random sub sampling was used
to obtain a balanced training and testing set with equal data points
from the native classes. Relevance vector machines [15] with simple
Gaussian kernels were used for classification. A leave-4-out cross
validation was done, with random sampling and 200 trials.
Outcome Prediction: In order to predict the player lynched at the
end of each game day, we analyzed several speaker-turn based fea-
tures, that are described in section 4. We hypothesized that play-
ers who are the most active in earlier rounds of the game have the
highest probability of being lynched because players have very lit-
tle knowledge about the roles of other players early on in the game.
Therefore, the outcomes will be strongly dependent on the nature of
conversation the players have amongst themselves. Players who are
subject to a lot of interruptions are either justifying their position
as non-liars, or are involved in the act of questioning or accusing
others.
Hence, we ranked players based on their speaker turn features
in descending order. We expected to see that one of the players who
appear at the top of this list (either in the top 2 or top 3), as de-
scribed before, will be in the act of justifying him/herself, as a result
of which, he/she will be eliminated from the round. We hypothesized
that the other top ranking players would tend to be involved more in
the interrogation or accusation process. Games after the third day
were removed since selecting a subset of two or three players from
the four that are remaining is difficult to make any conclusive judg-
ments on. Also, knowledge gained by the villagers with special roles
(seer and the little girl) might be used, since they gain significant
knowledge in the two or more night phases that precede these days.
6. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Deception and Suspicious Behavior Detection: The classification
performance of the best individual features for both the problems is
given in Table 4. Since we were using a balanced training and test-
ing set, the baseline would have a mean F-measure of 0.33, which
is obtained by choosing a single class always, giving F-measures for
the two classes as 0.67 and 0. When observing the performance of
single cues, we found that TSL performed slightly better, than other
cues. We found that the performance of the classifier was greatly en-
hanced by fusing all the features, with the best performance of 0.62
for deception detection. Comparable results are also seen for sus-
picious behavior detection, where one would expect that for suspi-
cious behaviour detection, people would tend to use more consistent
methods to detect who they perceived to be suspicious. We found
that when judged on a per-game basis, people were lynched a liar
52.3% of the time. Some of these successful lynchings would have
been due to knowledge from the seer or little girl and also cumulative
knowledge gained as the game progressed.
To compare our results with findings from social psychology
where experiments tended to be carried out in dyadic scenarios, we
use the standard mean differences (SMDs), used extensively as an
effect-measure in psychology on lie detection [5]. Hence, we com-
puted SMDs for the L and NL classes using the equation:
d =
(µ1−µ2)
V
Where V =
√
(N1−1)×σ
2
1
+(N2−1)×σ
2
2
(N1+N2−2)
Here µ1, µ2, σ21 , σ22 , N1, N2 are the means, variances and the num-
ber of data points of the distributions of the two classes that are be-
ing compared. We found that the SMDs for the L and NL classes
conformed to those found by social psychologists [5], which is inter-
esting since our scenario involves large group discussions. The best
SMDs were obtained for mF0 (d=0.1) and PR (d=0.204), showing
that the distribution of pitch and energy values are higher for liars.
Also, TSL and TST exhibited negative values of SMD. This con-
forms with prior work, as it has been commonly found that liars tend
to speak less, in order to avoid attention and making mistakes. We
also computed the SMDs for the NB and SB classes. We found that
TST (d=0.591) and TSL (d=0.414) showed the largest effect sizes.
Feature L vs. NL SB vs. NB
mF0 0.44 0.38
PR 0.44 0.39
TSL 0.45 0.39
PRT 0.44 0.41
Fusion 0.62 0.60
Baseline 0.33 0.33
Table 4. Mean F-measures for the two classes using RVM classifier
Feature Top-2 Top-3
TSL 52.63 63.16
UIR 47.36 63.16
IA 63.16 73.68
Table 5. Average performance for predicting the lynched player.
This shows that the players generally relied on higher speaker activ-
ity for lynching in the game-day. This also motivated us to investi-
gate TSL as a feature for outcome prediction. It should be noted that
these SMDs were computed for the unbalanced dataset, and does not
reflect how good the average classifier performance on the balanced
classes can be. We can however infer from the current results that
suspicious behaviour might show larger observable changes .
Outcome Prediction: We were able to successfully confirm our hy-
pothesis on the correlation between the activity of the player and the
lynchings in the game-day. Players with high TST, IA and UIR were
at the highest risk of being killed. The results based on the top-2 and
top-3 candidates are shown in Table 5. IA gives the best prediction,
which also reflects the findings of Raducanu et al. [2].
We analysed the results further by dividing the results depending
on the game phase (shown in Figure 4(a)). We see that the accuracy
of our predictions improved slightly with the length of the game-day
for all features. The prediction for the first two days is high. This
result confirms our hypothesis that the decisions will be strongly de-
pendent on speaker-turns in the first few rounds of a game. We also
observed similar trends for top-3 candidate (given in Figure 4(b))
with an improvement in performance. This could mean that there is
more than one person, who is in the act of accusing others, or, al-
ternatively, the decision is based on the conversation between more
than one person with the suspect. Finally, we see that best strategy
to remain alive in the initial rounds would be to avoid attention and
maintain a low activity, which is characterized by low values in TST,
IA and UIR.
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Fig. 4. Accuracy of prediction vs. Progress of game (a) Top-2 ranked
(b) Top-3 ranked features.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have successfully addressed two tasks. Firstly, we
have shown the possibility of automatically detecting deception and
suspicious behavior, as perceived by participants in social interac-
tions. The preliminary analysis has shown that non-verbal audio
cues can be used as indicators of deception and suspicious behav-
ior. Secondly, we have shown that the degree of speaker activity in
the initial phase of the game influences the decision of the group. In
the last round, however, the decision can be influenced by several
factors, such as the information seer might have (if alive), behavior
patterns observed by players in the previous rounds etc, which is a
subject for further investigation.
In continuation to the present work, we plan on increasing the
size of the data set, by recording more games. Additionally, we wish
to explore other non-verbal audio-visual features used for conversa-
tion analysis. A larger data set would also enable us to statistically
model the roles and outcomes in the game. Lastly, this study also is a
prelude to a more detailed analysis of behavioral changes in players
within and across games, and their effects on decision making.
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